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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ENTRAPMENT AND DUE PRO-
CESS OF LAW-THE EFFICACY OF ABSCAM TYPE OPERA-
TIONS-United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2906 (1982).
INTRODUCTION
Will elaborate "sting" operations conducted by law enforce-
ment agents, whose purpose is to ensnare or detect those predis-
posed to accept or extort bribes, be allowed by the federal courts?
As indicated most recently by the reaction of federal courts to the
ABSCAM operation,' the United States Supreme Court will allow
such operations to be conducted absent a showing that the govern-
ment implanted the intent to engage in the criminal conduct in the
defendant's minds, and absent unconstitutionally "outrageous"
government conduct.' The Third Circuit Court of Appeals in
United States v. Jannotti,3 held that the acceptance by two Phila-
delphia City Council members of $30,000 and $10,000 respectively
as bribes from FBI agents posing as repregentatives of a mythical
Arab Sheik was in violation of federal criminal law, that there was
no entrapment as a matter of law where the jury found defendants
to be predisposed to commit the crimes, and that such conduct by
the FBI was not in violation of due process.4
Where government agents offer bribes to public officials, the
acceptance of the bribes by public officials may itself evidence pre-
disposition which negates the defense of entrapment (as long as
1. United States v. Kelly, 33 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2151 (D.C. Cir. May 10,
1983); United States v. Alexandro, 675 F.2d 34 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
78 (1982); United States v. Carpentier, 689 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1982); United States
v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2906 (1982);
United States v. Myers, 692 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. Williams,
644 F.2d 950 (2d Cir. 1981).
2. See United States v. Alexandro, 675 F.2d 34 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 78 (1982); United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 2906 (1982). See also Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484
(1976); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973); Sherman v. United States,
356 U.S. 369 (1958); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932). However, Con-
gress may choose to codify the defense of entrapment or establish statutory guide-
lines for the FBI to follow in this area.
3. 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2906 (1982).
4. Id.
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the bribes are not excessive).' Furthermore, such conduct by the
government in offering the bribes to public officials in a "sting"
operation does not alone amount to a violation of due process, 6 and
evidently there is no due process violation when the government
agents persist to offer the bribes to the public official.7
This note will analyze primarily the United States v. Jannotti
phase of the overall ABSCAM operation, because of its particular
facts and its extensive discussion of both the entrapment defense
and its interrelated due process claim. The Third Circuit (in a 7-2
decision) reversed the district court's judgment notwithstanding
the verdict. The Third Circuit, the Second Circuit, and the District
of Columbia Circuit, in addressing other portions of ABSCAM,
have ruled that such government "sting" operations, within proper
bounds, are permissible under the law of entrapment and under
the Constitution.8 These holdings echo the law of entrapment that
the Supreme Court has pronounced since 1932,1 using the subjec-
tive test of the defendant's predispostion rather than an objective
test which focuses on the government's conduct. The courts also
looked at the nebulous constitutional test of whether the govern-
ment's conduct is "outrageous," thus in violation of due process.
The Jannotti decision reveals a fundamental distinction between
the subjective and objective tests of entrapment. This difference
pertains to who should decide whether entrapment exists: the ma-
jority of the court ruled that the jury is to decide the question of
whether defendant is predisposed; 10 the district court judge ruled
that there was entrapment as a matter of law;" and, the dissent
argued that the judge should objectively consider the question of
entrapment."2
With the denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court, this deci-
5. Id. at 604. See infra notes 159-64 and accompanying text.
6. Id. at 606-10.
7. United States v. Kelly, 539 F. Supp. 363 (D.D.C. 1982) (case dismissed by
Bryant, Senior District Judge), rev'd, 33 CrIM. L. REP. 2151 (D.C. Cir. May 10,
1983). There was disagreement as to whether Kelly actually rejected the bribes.
8. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578; Myers, 692 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1982); Alexandro, 675
F.2d 34 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 78 (1982). The District of Columbia
Circuit has held (since the writing of this note) that the ABSCAM operation with
regard to Congressman Kelly was not in violation of due process. United States v.
Kelly, 33 CRIM. L. REP. 2151 (D.C. Cir. May 10, 1983).
9. See infra notes 47-84 and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 108 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 5:377
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sion indicates that the government will be allowed to conduct these
"sting" operations as long as the jury finds that the defendants
were subjectively predisposed to commit the crimes, that the gov-
ernment did not implant the disposition and that merely offering
the bribes to public officials is not unconstitutional even though
the government has no prior suspicion of the defendants.1 3 This
decision also affirms the rule that the jury, and not the judge, is to
decide whether the bribes offered are excessive or whether defen-
dants are otherwise predisposed to commit the crimes. The Su-
preme Court and lower federal courts recognize the need for this
type of law enforcement activity to combat otherwise virtually un-
detectable "victimless" public corruption and illegal drug
dealings. 14
THE CASE
In United States v. Jannotti,15 the president of the Philadel-
phia City Council, George Schwartz, and the Council's majority
leader, Harry Jannotti, were found guilty by a jury of accepting
bribes in violation of federal law.16 The incident originated through
the efforts of the FBI's ABSCAM operation. In the overall opera-
tion, FBI agents posed as representatives of a fictional import-ex-
port firm, Abdul Enterprises, Ltd.17 The agents in the overall oper-
ation represented that their principal, fictional Arab Sheik Yassir
Habib of the nation of Abu Dhabi, was interested in investing large
amounts of money in the United States and in immigrating here.' 8
The government's plan was "conceived to create opportunities for
illicit conduct by public officials predisposed to commit political
13. See infra notes 201-204 and accompanying text. But where the govern-
ment continues its offer in the face of rejection, such conduct was ruled by the
district court judge in United States v. Kelly as overreaching. 539 F. Supp. 363
(D.D.C. 1982), rev'd, 33 Cram. L. REP. 2151 (D.C. Cir. May 10, 1983). But is this
really a question of both due process and entrapment, or just entrapment? Appar-
ently, it is a question of only entrapment.
14. See infra notes 222-32 and accompanying text.
15. 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2906 (1982).
16. 501 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (but district court judge granted ac-
quittal notwithstanding the verdict).
17. 673 F.2d at 581.
18. Id. For cases dealing with the immigration aspect, see United States v.
Carpentier, 689 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. Alexandro, 675 F.2d 34
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 78 (1982). See also United States v. Myers, 635
F.2d 932 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 956 (1980).
19831
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corruption." 9 The elaborate scheme also enlisted the aid of profes-
sional con-artist Melvin Weinburg, who was to help spread the
word that the Sheik was interested in meeting public officials who
could facilitate the Sheik's planned investments and
immigration.20
In the Philadelphia phase, Weinburg telephoned Howard
Criden, a Philadelphia attorney, and told him that the Sheik
wanted to build a hotel in Philadelphia.2 Criden had previously
received money from ABSCAM agents for introducing them to in-
terested congressmen in another phase of ABSCAM.22 Criden's re-
sponse to Weinburg was that building a hotel in Philadelphia with-
out problems related to zoning, condemnations and variances,
required the aid of city councilmen.2 Criden also represented that
his law firm partner, Louis Johanson, was on the city council and
that the president of the council, George Schwartz, "is a powerful
guy . . . Has got power. '24
When asked by an agent, posing as a representative of the
Sheik, whether they could deal with Schwartz, Criden answered
that they could,'25 even though Criden actually did not personally
know Schwartz.' 6 The agent and Criden then agreed on an offer of
$30,000 and Criden said that he would see if Schwartz would "bite
at thirty.' 7
In a later meeting, the agents were told by Johanson, that he,
Schwartz and Jannotti ran the city council, and Johanson and
Schwartz agreed to bring Jannotti in on the deal.' Criden then
19. Brief for Appellant at 6, United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d at 581.
20. 673 F.2d at 581.
21. Id.
22. Id. This was done with Criden's aid of Louis C. Johanson and Mayor
Errichetti of Camden, New Jersey. They arranged for ABSCAM agents to meet
with four congressmen, including Philadelphia Congressmen Myers and Lederer.
Id. The congressmen agreed to introduce immigration bills in return for money,
and they were indicted and convicted. See United States v. Myers, 692 F.2d 823
(2d Cir. 1982); United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 932 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 956 (1980); United States v. Myers, 527 F. Supp. 1206 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
23. 673 F.2d at 582. Criden was told by the agents that titles impress tbe
Sheik and that they wanted to deal with someone in municipal government to
avoid such problems. Id.
24. Record at A354-55, id. at 582.
25. 673 F.2d at 582.
26. Id. at 583.
27. Record at A376-77, id.
28. 673 F.2d at 583.
[Vol. 5:377
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sent word through intermediaries that investors were willing to pay
for Schwartz's "advice. ' 29 Schwartz responded that he would be in-
terested in anyone who would invest $150 million to build a hotel
in Philadelphia 0 and met with Criden.5 '
Schwartz and Criden then met with the agents. 32 The lead
ABSCAM agent told Schwartz he wanted to firm up the invest-
ment, that the Sheik wanted to take up permanent residence in
Philadelphia, and that he was there to take care of the Sheik's po-
tential problems.33 Schwartz then boasted of his political power, of
his ability to control the council and of his power to deliver the
council members to the agent for his birthday.34 He further ex-
plained that there would be no "insurmountable" problems as long
as the hotel was a "proper project"3 5 because there were relief
mechanisms in the building standards and zoning commissions. 36
The agent, assured that the problems would be taken care of,
handed Schwartz an envolope containing $30,000 and Schwartz
placed it into his pocket.37
Later, Jannotti arrived with Criden after being briefed by
Criden and Schwartz. 38 After being assured that the hotel would be
"on board" and not phony, and after being told by the agents of
the "Arab state of mind's" need for "friends" to prevent problems,
Jannotti assured the agents that they had a friend and a vote, that
he and Schwartz controlled the city council, and that Criden had
been "very graphic" about the transaction. 9 An agent then handed
29. Id. at 583-84. Six thousand dollars were given to the two friends of
Schwartz who arranged for the meeting of Criden with Schwartz. One of the in-
termediaries was a Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas Judge. But noth-
ing in the opinion indicates that the intermediaries were breaking the law in ar-
ranging the meeting in return for the money. In fact, the judge gave his $3,000
share to the other intermediary to avoid any impropriety. Id.
30. Id. at 584.
31. There is no record of the conversation of their meeting. Id.
32. Id. The meeting between Schwartz, Criden and the agents was video-
taped. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 584-85.
35. Record at A698, id. at 585.
36. 673 F.2d at 585. The agent responded that the hotel was not going to be a
cathouse. Id.
37. Id. at 586. At this point, Criden received a $5,000 fee for the arrange-
ments. Id. at 587.
38. Id. at 587. They had "explained the whole situation."
39. Id. at 588. When the agent asked Jannotti whether he could go back to
the Shiek and tell him that he "dealt with a man ... explain who you were, what
19831
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Jannotti an envelope containing $10,000 and asked if that amount
was sufficient.4" Jannotti took the envelope saying that it had been
"discussed" and he refused to discuss it any further."'
The jury found both Schwartz and Jannotti guilty of accepting
bribes in violation of federal law42 but the district court judge set
aside the verdict, ruling that both defendants were entitled to ac-
quittal on grounds that entrapment was established as a matter of
law and that, alternatively, the defendants were entitled to acquit-
tal on the grounds that the government's conduct was overreaching
in violation of due process.' 3 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the district court and reinstated the jury's verdict, ruling
that the evidence presented by the government was sufficient to
permit the jury to find that the defendants had sufficient predispo-
sition to commit the crimes involved and that the government's
conduct did not amount to a deprivation of due process.44 Accord-
ing to the court of appeals, the district court erred in its legal anal-
ysis and usurped the function of the jury to decide contested issues
of fact.' 5
BACKGROUND
The United States Supreme Court first considered the entrap-
ment defense in 1932 in Sorrells v. United States,46 although the
lower federal courts had recognized the defense for quite some
time.47 The Supreme Court held that the jury was entitled to con-
sider whether defendant's acts of possessing and selling one-half
your position is and say he and I conducted a cash business transaction and he
guaranteed me, we don't have a problem in Philadelphia .... [H]e has influence
. . .," Jannotti answered that, "Problems might arise, but problems ah, you might
say problems can be solved." Id. at 589.
40. Id. at 589.
41. Id.
42. United States v. Jannotti, 501 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Pa. 1980). Schwartz
was found guilty by the jury of conspiring to violate provisions of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), and both
Schwartz and Jannotti were found guilty by the jury of conspiring to obstruct
interstate commerce in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a).
43. Id.
44. 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2906 (1982).
45. Id. at 581.
46. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
47. See Woo Wai v. United States, 223 F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915); Murchison,
The Entrapment Defense in Federal Courts: Emergence of a Legal Doctrine, 47
Miss. L.J. 211 (1976).
[Vol. 5:377
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gallon of whiskey in violation of the National Prohibition Act were
instigated by an undercover prohibition agent; the jury was to de-
cide whether the government implanted "in the mind of an inno-
cent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense and in-
duce[d] its commission in order that they may prosecute. '48 Thus,
the test set forth by the Court focuses on whether the defendant is
predisposed to commit the crime. The Court's rationale lies not in
the Constitution but rather in a belief that Congress did not in-
tend for statutes to be enforced by the government tempting inno-
cent persons into violations. 49
The Court further ruled, however, that the government merely
affording the opportunities or facilities for commission of the of-
fense does not defeat prosecution,5" and that law enforcement may
use "artifice and stratagem" to catch those engaged in criminal
enterprises.5 1
The Supreme Court next addressed the entrapment defense in
Sherman v. United States."2 In Sherman, Mr. Chief Justice War-
ren's majority opinion stated that the undisputed testimony of the
prosecution's witnesses established entrapment as a matter of law;
the defendant obtained narcotics for the government's informer
only after the informer's repeated persuasion, appeal to sympathy
and inducement of defendant himself to return to a narcotics
habit.5 3 Adhering to the predisposition test, the Supreme Court
concluded that "[t]o determine whether entrapment has been es-
tablished, a line must be drawn between the trap for the unwary
innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal.' 4 The function of
law enforcement does not include the manufacturing of crime." In
determining whether the government had convinced an otherwise
unwilling person to commit a criminal act, the "accused will be
subjected to an 'appropriate and searching inquiry into his own
conduct and predisposition' as bearing on his claim of
innocence."' 6
48. 287 U.S. at 442.
49. Id. at 445-49.
50. Id. at 441.
51. Id.
52. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 372.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 373 (quoting Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932)).
1983] 383
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A. The Subjective Versus Objective Approaches
These two Supreme Court decisions thus established the sub-
jective theory of entrapment. The theory focuses on whether the
government implanted the disposition to commit the crime in the
defendant's mind, not on whether the government's conduct is rea-
sonable. Inquiry must be made into whether the defendant was
predisposed to commit the crime, and the Supreme Court majority
have left this determination with the jury.5 7
The objective theory, on the other hand, first advocated by
Mr. Justice Roberts' concurrence in Sorrells, would focus on the
nature of the government's conduct.58 Likewise, Mr. Justice Frank-
furter, concurring in Sherman, would shift the "attention from the
record and predisposition of the particular defendant to the con-
duct of the police and the likelihood, objectively considered, that it
would entrap only those ready and willing to commit crime. ' If
the government's conduct does not meet this objective standard,
the defendant's predisposition is inconsequential." Unlike the ma-
jority opinions in Sorrells and Sherman, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
argued that it is a fiction to say Congress did not intend the stat-
utes to be enforced by tempting innocent persons into violations. 1
He reasoned that "the only legislative intention that can with any
show of reason be extracted from the statute is the intention to
make criminal precisely the conduct in which the defendant has
engaged;'62 therefore he concluded that the focus of the test of en-
trapment should be on the reasonableness of the government's
conduct."
The objective theory ultimately rests with Mr. Justice Rob-
erts' belief that public policy requires the courts to protect "the
purity of government and its processes"' and, with what Mr. Jus-
tice Frankfurter expressed 65 as the corollary supervisory power of
the Court, to formulate and apply proper standards for federal law
57. See infra note 147 and accompanying text.
58. 287 U.S. at 453-59 (Roberts, J., concurring).
59. 356 U.S. at 384 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
60. Id. at 380.
61. Id. at 379.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 382.
64. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 455 (1932) (Roberts, J.,
concurring).
65. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 380-81 (1958) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
384 [Vol. 5:377
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enforcement.66 Thus, as the argument goes, the test should be ap-
plied by the court and not the jury.!"
Since Sherman, only two more Supreme Court cases have di-
rectly addressed the entrapment issue. In United States v. Rus-
sell,6 8 an undercover narcotics agent was investigating defendant
and his confederates who were in the process of unlawfully manu-
facturing and possessing a drug.69 The agent offered the defen-
dants an essential ingredient which, although difficult to obtain,
was legal to possess and was obtainable. 0
The Court in an opinion written by Mr. Justice Rehnquist
held that the agent's contribution of the ingredient to such crimi-
nal enterprise did not violate the due process clause of the fifth
amendment.71 The majority reaffirmed the subjective test of Sor-
rells and Sherman and ruled that creative involvement by govern-
ment agents is not a defense for a predisposed defendant.72 On ap-
peal, the defendant conceded that the jury properly found him
predisposed, but he argued that the evidence established entrap-
ment as a matter of law.78 The court of appeals agreed with the
defendant,74 so it expanded the traditional test of entrapment by
allowing the court to determine whether there has been "an intol-
66. See Note, Entrapment as a Due Process Defense: Developments After
Hampton v. United States, 57 IND. L.J., 89, 96 (1982).
67. Sherman, 356 U.S. 369, 380 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Sorrells,
287 U.S. 435, 457 (1932) (Roberts, J., concurring). See also Note, supra note 66 at
98-100; Parks, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REv. 163 (1976). The
argument is also made that the subjective test is inherently prejudicial to defen-
dants in that it permits admission of character and reputation evidence bearing
on disposition. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 443 (Stewart, J., dissent-
ing); Sherman, 356 U.S. 369, 382 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Another criticism
of the subjective test is that it fosters unequal treatment under the law between
those who are predisposed and those who are not, regardless of the government's
conduct. See Note, supra note 66 at 99. Also, some argue that the subjective test
fails to provide law enforcement with guidelines for permissible conduct. Sher-
man, 356 U.S. 369, 385 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). On the other hand, the argu-
ment is made that per se rules of the objective test would allow cautious criminals
to design their activities to the letter to avoid the law. See Parks, supra at 228; J.
SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 103 (1966).
68. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
69. Id. at 424-25. The drug was methamphetamine.
70. Id. The ingredient was phenyl-2-propanone.
71. Id. at 432.
72. Id. at 433.
73. Id. at 427.
74. United States v. Russell, 459 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1972).
1983]
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erable degree of governmental participation in criminal enter-
prises. '" The Supreme Court majority, however, reversed the
court of appeals' decision and expressly refused to alter the de-
fense of entrapment as defined by the majority opinions of Sorrells
and Sherman.7
According to the Supreme Court in Russell, the defense of en-
trapment is:
rooted, not in the authority of the Judicial Branch to dismiss
prosecutions for what it feels to have been "overzealous law en-
forcement," but instead in the notion that Congress could not
have intended criminal punishment for a defendant who has com-
mitted all the elements of a proscribed offense but was induced to
commit them by the Government.7
While the Court in Russell reaffirmed the predisposition ap-
proach of entrapment, it did mention the possibility of another de-
fense (or claim) based upon due process: "While we may some day
be presented with a situation in which the conduct of law enforce-
ment agents is so outrageous that due process principles would ab-
solutely bar the government from invoking judicial processess to
obtain a conviction .. .the instant case is distinctly not of that
breed. e78 However, the opinion at the same time acknowledged the
difficulty of embodying the notion of due process of law into fixed
rules. 9
The dissenting opinion again advocated adoption of an objec-
tive approach. Mr. Justice Stewart argued that the underlying ba-
sis of the entrapment defense demands adherence to an approach
that focuses on the government's conduct rather than on whether
the defendant was predisposed.80
In its fourth address of the entrapment defense, the Supreme
Court followed its previous decisions. In Hampton v. United
States,81 the Court held that the fact that heroin sold by the de-
75. Id. at 673.
76. 411 U.S. at 433.
77. Id. at 435.
78. Id. at 431-32 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The Court based the
concept of outrageous conduct on the shocking to the conscience standard of
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
79. 411 U.S. 431.
80. Id. at 440-42 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (joined by Brennan, J., and Mar-
shall, J.) (See Douglas, J., dissenting). See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S.
369, 378 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
81. 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
[Vol. 5:377
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fendant to government agents was originally supplied to defendant
by a government informant did not violate due process rights of
the defendant who was predisposed to commit the crime.82 The
jury found predisposition even though, according to the defendant,
the government supplied the corpus delecti itself.83 The majority
of the Court, in an opinion written by Mr. Justice Rehnquist and a
concurring opinion written by Mr. Justice Powell, adhered to the
subjective test as set out in Sorrells and followed in Sherman and
Russell: "It is only when the government's deception actually im-
plants the criminal design in the mind of defendant that the de-
fense of entrapment comes into play." 4
In Hampton, the defendant requested and advocated an ob-
jective type of approach focusing on the government's behavior
rather than on predisposition of the defendant, 8 but the Supreme
Court ruled that the defense of entrapment is not available to a
predisposed defendant.8 8 Furthermore, the Court rejected the de-
fendant's due process defense as the plurality emphasized that de-
fendant's constitutional rights had to be violated in order to avail
on a due process claim: "The limitations of the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment come into play only when the Govern-
ment activity in question violates some protected right of the
defendant. 8 7
In fact, three members of the Court in Hampton would limit
further when a claim of violation of due process may be asserted.
The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice White joined Mr. Justice Rehn-
quist in the opinion that, if the defendant is found to be predis-
posed, not only is the defense of entrapment unavailable but also a
82. Id.
83. 425 U.S. 484, 485-87 (1976). The government's evidence differed with de-
fendant's contention that the government informant initiated the illegal drug
deals. Predisposition was little in doubt, for the defendant requested a jury in-
struction that he was entrapped if they found that the government informer, act-
ing for the government supplied the narcotics even though defendant may have
been predisposed. Id. at 485-88.
84. Id. at 489 (quoting United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 436 (1973)).
See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958); Sorrells v. United States,
287 U.S. 435, 442 (1932).
85. Id. at 487-88.
86. Id. at 490. The Court went on to state that "the police conduct here no
more deprived defendant of any right secured by the United States Constitution
than did the police conduct in Russell deprive Russell of any rights." Id. at 490-
91.
87. Id. at 490.
3871983]
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violation of due process cannot properly be claimed.88 Mr. Justice
Powell, in a concurring opinion with whom Mr. Justice Blackmun
joined, agreed that there was no entrapment in the case at hand
but felt that a finding of predispostion was not a bar to a due pro-
cess claim.89 While agreeing with Mr. Justices Powell and Black-
mun that a finding of entrapment was- no bar to a due process
claim, the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justices Brennan, Stewart and
Marshall advocated the objective test where the judge, and not the
jury, would decide whether the conduct of the government was un-
lawful.9' Thus, the majority ruling maintained the subjective ap-
proach to the question of entrapment and it also provided that a
defendant who is predisposed to commit the crime in question is
not barred from properly asserting a claim that the government's
conduct was unconstitutionally "outrageous."
B. Unconstitutional Outrageous Government Conduct
From Sorrells to Hampton, the majority of the Supreme Court
has refused to adopt the objective approach. Instead, the Court has
recognized the possibility of police conduct being so outrageous as
to amount to a violation of due process rights, thereby barring
prosecution.9' Due to the difficulty of embodying the notion of
what is "outrageous" into fixed rules, an ad hoc approach has
been followed.
The theory behind the concept of outrageous conduct is ap-
parently based upon the concept of "fundamental fairness"98 as
enunciated in Rochin v. California;9' the theorectical basis of the
Rochin standard is based upon substantive due process.95
The due process-ourageous conduct defense has been sus-
88. Id. at 489-90.
89. Id. at 491-95.
90. Id. at 496-500.
91. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973).
92. Id. at 431.
93. Id. at 431-32.
94. 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952) ("canons of decency and fairness which express
the notions of justice of English speaking people. . . .") (pumping stomach for
evidence was shocking to the conscience). The exclusionary rule of search and
seizure cases is a step away from the nebulous Rochin standard. See Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961). See also Abramson & Lindeman, Entrapment
and Due Process in the Federal Courts, 8 AM. J. CRIM. L. .139 (1980).
95. See Angel, Substantive Due Process and the Criminal Law, 9 Loy. CHI.
L.J. 61, 74 (1977) (substantive due process in criminal law); Note supra, note 66,
at 122.
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tained in a Third Circuit Court of Appeals 6 case, in a federal dis-
trict court case in California,97 and recently in a separate federal
district court ABSCAM trial before being reversed on appeal.98 In
United States v. Twigg,99 the government supplied essential ingre-
dients, glassware, and other laboratory equipment, in addition to a
suitable location, for defendants to produce LSD. 00 The govern-
ment's informant provided expertise and was at all times in charge
of the laboratory.101 Twigg furnished neither knowledge, money,
supplies nor ideas. 0 2 He merely began running errands at the re-
quest of the informant, 03 and "would not even have shared in the
proceeds of the sale of the drug."'" The Third Circuit found such
conduct to be "overreaching" and in violation of due process of
law, for the "egregious conduct on the part of government agents
generated new crimes . . . merely for the sake of pressing criminal
charges." 05
The ABSCAM operation, however, provided the courts an op-
portunity to apply the defense of entrapment to, and determine
the constitutionality of, government operations that are designed
to create opportunities for illicit conduct by public officials predis-
posed to commit political corruption.
96. United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978).
97. United States v. Batres-Santolino, 521 F. Supp. 744 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
98. United States v. Kelly, 539 F. Supp. 363 (D.D.C. 1982); rev'd, 33 CRM. L.
REP. (BNA) 2151 (D.C. Cir. May 10, 1983). The outrageous conduct claim was
also sustained by the district court in Jannotti before being reversed by the court
of appeals. United States v. Jannotti, 501 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd.,
673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2906 (1982).
99. 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978).
100. Id. at 380.
101. Id. at 380-81.
102. Id. at 382.
103. Id. at 376.
104. Id. at 382.
105. Id. at 381. In United States v. Batres-Santolino, 521 F. Supp. 744 (N.D.
Cal. 1981), the defendants were indicted for conspiracy to import cocaine into the
United States. But because they had no prior experience in large-scale drug smug-
gling and lacked the ability to smuggle drugs into the United States on their own,
the court ruled that government agents therefore "'manufactured' a crime that
... could not and would not have been committed," and such conduct thus vio-
lated due process. Id. at 751-52.
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ANALYSIS
In United States v. Jannotti,10 s the Third Circuit held that
the evidence presented by the government was sufficient to permit
the jury to find that defendants had sufficient predisposition to
commit the acts of bribery and extortion, and that their convic-
tions were not the result of entrapment as a matter of law.107 In so
holding, the Third Circuit ruled that the district court, in granting
an acquittal notwithstanding the jury's verdict, usurped the func-
tion of the jury to decide contested issues of fact.1"8 Furthermore,
the Third Circuit held that the government's conduct in this por-
tion of the ABSCAM operation was not "outrageous" conduct in
violation of due process of law.109
Although the legal principles were not in serious dispute,110
the court of appeals' application of the legal principles of the four
Supreme Court cases dealing with entrapment "' strictly adhered
to the subjective approach established in those Supreme Court
cases," 2 while the district court's application was akin to the objec-
tive approach."' The Jannotti court of appeals' opinion reiterated
the test set out in Sorrells: whether the government implanted "in
the mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit the al-
leged offense" and induced its commission." 4 The opinion also re-
iterated the test set out in Sherman: "To determine whether en-
trapment has been established, a line must be drawn between the
trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary crimi-
nal.""' Strengthening its stance on the subjective approach, the
106. 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2906 (1982).
107. Id. at 580-81. Defendant Schwartz was found guilty by the jury of con-
spiring to violate provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), and both Schwartz and Jannotti were found
guilty by the jury of conspiring to obstruct interstate commerce in violation of the
Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). Id. at 580.
108. Id. at 581.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 596.
111. Hampton, 425 U.S. 484 (1976); Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973); Sherman,
356 U.S. 369 (1958); Sorrells, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
112. 673 F.2d at 596.606.
113. See United States v. Jannotti, 501 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Pa. 1980). Dis-
trict court judge found entrapment as a matter of law basing his decision, in sum,
on the opinion that the government offered "such attractive inducements" as
were bound to overwhelm. Id. at 1200.
114. 673 F.2d at 596. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 442 (1932).
115. 673 F.2d at 596. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958).
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court of appeals noted that in Russell "the Court expressly disap-
proved of the decisions of the lower federal courts which had ex-
panded the entrapment defense beyond the Court's opinons in
Sorrells and Sherman.""u The Third Circuit in Jannotti further
reasoned that the test of entrapment rests with whether the defen-
dant is predisposed, because the defense of entrapment is not of
constitutional dimension and is a "relatively limited defense .. .
which cannot be used by a predisposed defendant. '117
This rule is supported in Hampton, where even though the
government supplied the corpus delecti, no entrapment was found
because defendant was predisposed." 8
The Jannotti decision, therefore, falls in line with the Su-
preme Court's enunciation that as long as the government's con-
duct is within constitutional limitations courts will not interfere
with the Executive Branch's enforcement of federal laws against
predisposed defendants.1 9 Proponents of the objective approach,
however, argue that it is within the power of federal courts in the
administration of criminal justice to "formulate and apply 'proper
standards for the enforcement of the federal criminal law in the
federal courts.' "20 Whatever the merits of each approach may be,
it seems that the latter approach is more appropriately within the
realm of substantive due process and thus part of the outrageous
conduct due process standard. Although the Supreme Court has
116. 673 F.2d at 597. Indeed, the Court in Russell, in referring to the lower
federal court decisions expanding the entrapment defense, stated that,
the defense of entrapment enunciated in those opinions was not intended
to give the federal judiciary a "chancellor's foot" veto over law enforce-
ment practices of which it did not approve. The execution of the federal
laws under our Constitution is confided primarily to the Executive
Branch of the Government, subject to applicable constitutional and stat-
utory limitations and to judicially fashioned rules to enforce those limita-
tions. We think that the decision of the Court of Appeals in this case
quite unnecessarily introduces an unmanageably subjective standard
which is contrary to the holdings of this Court in Sorrells and Sherman.
411 U.S. 423 at 435.
117. 673 F.2d at 597 (citation omitted). See United States v. Russell, 411
U.S. 423, 435 (1973).
118. 425 U.S. 484 (1976). According to the defendant, the government's in-
formant enlisted his partnership in the illegal drug dealings, although he admitted
predisposition. Id. at 486-88.
119. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. at 490; United States v. Rus-
sell, 411 U.S. at 435.
120. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 380 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting Mc-
Nabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943)).
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perhaps "been applying substantive due process analysis in crimi-
nal cases under the rubrics of procedural due process, equal pro-
tection, right to privacy and eighth amendment," 11 it would be
difficult to embody fixed rules to apply to the entrapment defense
since each case is usually so factually subjective. 2'
For example, the amount of a bribe offered to an office clerk
might not be tempting to a wealthier public official, and what is
tempting to one public official might not be tempting to a wealth-
ier official. Thus, who is to decide whether the bribe offered was so
excessive as to induce an otherwise innocent person to accept it,
even with the supposition that the "sting" otherwise met the re-
quirements of an objective approach? Even if the judge were to
decide the question by applying an objective standard, she would
have to look at the particular defendant's position in life to deter-
mine whether the amount of the bribe offered would induce an
otherwise innocent person in the same position. Since it would be
impossible to establish rules to apply to every conceivable position
in life, a question exists as to whether a reasonable person in the
defendant's position in life would be likely to accept or refuse the
bribe. The jury can decide this question by applying everyday
standards of logic, knowledge and fair play.
Therefore, the Third Circuit reiterated the subjective ap-
proach in that the entrapment defense focuses on "intent or pre-*
disposition of the defendant to commit the crime. 1 23 This test of
entrapment has survived from Sorrells through Sherman and was
definitely reaffirmed in Russell and Hampton.
The Jannotti district court, in theory, was generally.in accord
with the court of appeals as to the law of the subjective test but
ruled as a matter of law that entrapment existed.1 24 The major dif-
ferences between the decisions of the district court and the court
of appeals rests in their interpretation of "predisposition," and
when evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to establish
predisposition.12 5
There was no question in Jannotti, however, that in order to
raise the defense of entrapment the defendant must first present
evidence that the government induced the defendant's action and
121. See Angel, supra note 95, at 74.
122. See United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d at 599.
123. Id. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. at 429.
124. United States v. Jannotti, 501 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Pa. 1980). Actually,
however, more of an objective approach was taken.
125. See generally id. at 1200 and 673 F.2d at 597-606.
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then present some evidence that he was not predisposed. 2 6 The
government then has the burden to disprove entrapment by show-
ing predisposition. 27
A. Predispostion
A person is predisposed to commit a crime when he or she is
ready and willing to commit the crime prior to the government's
involvement through solicitation or aid.128 Stated in the negative, a
person is not predisposed when the government implants in the
mind of an innocent person the dispostion to commit the offense
and induces its commission. 12 9
The Third Circuit in Jannotti, addressing the question of
predispostion, stated that "although there may be instances where
undisputed facts establish the entrapment defense as a matter of
law . .. 30 entrapment is generally a jury question." 13' The district
court judge based his decision in part on the fact that the govern-
ment, in establishing predispostion, relied exclusively on the fact
that defendants accepted the money.132 The general rule, however,
with which the district court agreed,3  is that a defendant's ready
acquiescence to the government's suggestion may be enough to jus-
126. 673 F.2d at 597. See United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 49 (3d Cir.
1975); Kadis v. United States, 373 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1967); United States v. Riley,
363 F.2d 955 (2d Cir. 1966). Once the defendant has raised the entrapment de-
fense, he will be subjected to an "'appropriate and searching inquiry into his own
conduct and predisposition,' as bearing on his claim of innocence." Sherman v.
United States, 356 U.S. 369, 373 (1958) (quoting Sorrells v. United States, 287
U.S. 435, 451 (1932)).
127. See United States v. Watson, 489 F.2d 504, 510 (3d Cir. 1973). See also
Murchison, supra note 47, at 604-06.
128. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 375.
129. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 442.
130. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958). Where the facts
were insufficient to demand an entrapment instruction, see United States v.
Armocida, 515 F.2d 49, 55-56 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. Payseur, 501 F.2d
966, 970-71 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Smith, 489 F.2d 1330, 1334-35 (7th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 994 (1974).
131. 673 F.2d at 597. See United States v. Lentz, 624 F.2d 1280, 1286 (5th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 995 (1981); United States v. Bocra, 623 F.2d 281,
288-89 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 875 (1980); United States v. Twigg, 588
F.2d 373, 376 (3d Cir. 1978). See also United States v. Klosterman, 248 F.2d 191,
194-95 (3d Cir. 1957); Tzimopoulos v. United States, 554 F.2d 1216, 1217 (1st
Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 851 (1977).
132. 501 F. Supp. at 1200.
133. Id.
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tify a finding of predispostion. 131 Yet, the district court judge be-
lieved that defendants were not predisposed to accept the bribes
because the bribes were "such attractive inducements as to pre-
clude any reliance upon the defendants' acceptance of the money
as proof of predispostion. ' ' 135 But Schwartz and Jannotti accepted
the money readily and without refusal. Congressman Kelly in
United States v. Kelly"3 6 was found by the trial judge, over the
jury's verdict, not to be predisposed when he purportedly accepted
the bribe money only after many refusals; but, this finding was re-
versed on appeal.13 7
The district court in Jannotti remarked that "[n]o-one who
has viewed the videotape evidence in this case could avoid feelings
of distress and disgust at the crass behavior [of the defendants'
that] the tapes reveal." 36 The district court nevertheless granted
judgment for defendants because "[t]he evidence was, as a matter
of law, insufficient to establish the defendants' predispostion be-
yond a reasonable doubt."1 '
Of primary importance to the question of entrapment, how-
ever, is who is to decide whether defendants are predisposed to
commit the crimes. The district court, in overruling the jury's ver-
dict, believed that this determination was for the judge in this par-
ticular case, and the court of appeals' dissenting opinion agreed.
The majority of the court of appeals, on the other hand, ruled to
the contrary. Thus, the Third Circuit's en banc decision in Jan-
notti, which is in line with the Supreme Court's rulings on entrap-
ment, in effect provides that it is for the jury to decide whether or
not the government implanted in the mind of a defendant the dis-
position to commit the crime where government undercover agents
offer bribes to public officials in a "sting" operation.
Accordingly, the court of appeals criticized the district court's
judgment notwithstanding the verdict by proclaiming that before
overturning a jury's finding of predispostion, "the trial court must
134. United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d at 597-98. See e.g., United States v.
Valencia, 645 F.2d 1158, 1167-68 (2d Cir. 1980) (ready response to drug sale pro-
posal); United States v. Viviano, 437 F.2d 295, 299 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
983 (1971) (ready response to bribe solicitation).
135. 501 F. Supp. at 1200.
136. 539 F. Supp. 363 (D.D.C. 1982), rev'd, 33 CmM. L. REP. (BNA) 2151
(D.C. Cir. May 10, 1983).
137. Id.
138. 501 F. Supp. at 1205.
139. Id. at 1200.
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view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
and resolve all inferences therefrom in its favor."' 140 Furthermore,
there is entrapment as a matter of law only when on the evidence
before the jury, no reasonable juror could find predisposition be-
yond a reasonable doubt."" The court of appeals also pointed out
that credibility determinations are for the jury,"14 in determining
whether a defendant was predisposed to commit the crime.
The Jannotti dissenting opinion argued, however, that for a
jury question to exist there must be an issue of credibility of the
witnesses, and that there was no contest here."43 The dissent rea-
soned that determinations of the weight to be given evidence ap-
plies in only two situations: where credibility is an issue and where
proof beyond a reasonable doubt is an issue." According to the
dissent, before determinations of questions of fact go to the jury,
the judge is to make a legal determination as to the beyond a rea-
sonable doubt standard with all reasonable inferences in favor of
the prosecution.' 4 This is the test, argued the dissent, that should
be applied on the issue of whether defendants were predisposed to
commit the acts absent inducement by the government. 46
While there may be merit in this argument framed as an ob-
jective approach, the Supreme Court has since Sorrells rejected
the notion that the factual issue of entrapment is to be decided by
the trial judge. 47 Thus, the question arises as to whether there is a
factual issue. If there is a factual issue, there are also questions of
witness credibility.
The Jannotti dissent argued that there was no question of fact
for the jury because it was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt
that defendants were predisposed. 48 Yet, courts have ruled that
mere acceptance of bribe money can show predisposition;" 9 and
140. 673 F.2d at 598. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942);
United States v. Artuso, 618 F.2d 192, 195-96 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 861
(1980).
141. 673 F.2d at 598. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16 (1978).
142. 673 F.2d at 598. See e.g., United States v. Bocra, 623 F.2d 281, 289 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 875 (1980).
143. 673 F.2d at 623 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. at 377.
148. 673 F.2d at 614.
149. United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d at 599; United States v. Jannotti,
501 F. Supp. at 1200; United States v. Valencia, 645 F.2d 1158, 1167-68 (2d Cir.
1983]
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since predispostion depends upon subjective intent, there is then a
question of fact for the jury as to intent. Thus, credibility ques-
tions exist, such as to actions determinative of intent. 50 Also, even
with the dissent's stance that the judge should first decide whether
the prosecution has overcome the beyond a reasonable doubt stan-
dard, the judge must apply the facts to the law to see whether the
standard has been overcome. Nevertheless, if subjective intent is to
be determined there is a question of fact, no matter what legal
precedents apply.
Thus, the dissent's reasoning would work under the objective
approach, in whether the government's conduct was reasonable, for
the judge would only have to apply a reasonable person standard
without subjective intent and credibility having to be determined.
Indeed, the argument has been made that the test of entrapment
should be based on whether the government's conduct would be
likely to induce a reasonable person to commit the illegal acts he
would not otherwise commit but for the inducement.151 But in ap-
plying the reasonable person standard, it is the jury and not the
court in a civil negligence case that applies the facts to the stan-
dard, unless the court is convinced that no reasonable juror could
decide otherwise.
As long as the subjective test is used, the question of predispo-
sition is for the jury, and although there is a beyond a reasonable
doubt standard in establishing predispostion, there are credibility
questions for the jury as to the question of subjective intent. Nev-
ertheless, there appears to be some objectiveness for the jury in
using the subjective test. This objectiveness can be found in both
the Sherman test that "a line must be drawn between the trap for
the unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal"'' 5 and
the Sorrells test that the government cannot implant in the mind
of an innocent person the disposition to commit the offense." 3
The district court in Jannotti ruled that three factors contrib-
1980); United States v. Viviano, 437 F.2d 295, 299 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
983 (1971). See supra text accompanying note 134.
150. Evidence of prior convictions and reputation are admissible to establish
predisposition. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 488-89 (1976); United
States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 433 (1973).
151. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. at 384 (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring) (conduct that is likely to entrap only those ready and willing to commit
crime); Note, supra note 66, at 125.
152. 356 U.S. at 372.
153. 287 U.S. at 442.
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uted to its conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to prove
predisposition. First, the district court found the $30,000 and
$10,000 bribes were so large or "exceedingly generous" "as to over-
come an official's natural reluctance to accept a bribe. . . .What
would be tempting to an office clerk plainly would not be enough
to tempt a millionaire."' 54
In a separate ABSCAM case, United States v. Myers,155 Dis-
trict Court Judge Pratt pointed out that other legislators who had
been approached with bribes of sums exceeding $30,000 found
themselves capable of rejecting the offers. 15 Therefore, a question
exists as to whether the amounts were excessive in trying to ac-
complish the "sting's" objective of detecting those who are ready
and willing to engage in public corruption. If other legislators are
capable of turning down equal or greater sums of money, who is to
decide whether the government implanted the disposition in the
minds of the defendants? This certainly falls under a question of
fact for the jury. As Mr. Justice Powell said in Hampton, in decid-
ing the issue of predisposition there is a question of degree of crim-
inal involvement and intent. 157 Therefore, it is virtually impossible
to proscribe rules to determine whether a particular defendant's
position in life satisfies the requirements of being an "unwary in-
nocent."' 5 8 Again, a question of fact exists for jury determination.
The second factor the district court in Jannotti relied on in
ruling that predisposition was not proved beyond a reasonable
doubt was that defendants were not asked or expected to do any-
thing improper nor inconsistent with their obligations as city coun-
cil members. 59 However, the district court also stated that,
"[t]here is no dispute about the defendants' receipt of the pay-
ments, and the evidence permitted, although it did not compel, the
inference that the payments represented bribes paid in exchange
154. 673 F.2d at 599. There was barely any evidence of the defendants'
financial positions. Schwartz had previously practiced law and Jannotti owned a
bar. Id.
155. 527 F. Supp. 1206 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd in part and rev'd and re-
manded in part on other grounds, 692 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1982).
156. Id. at 1227-29.
157. 425 U.S. at 494 n.5. Mr. Justice Powell uses the drug scene to illustrate
the difference between a "pusher" and a "hard core" professional versus a high
school youth "pushing" to friends. Id.
158. This is without regard to whether the government's conduct is so outra-
geous as to violate due process. For discussion of outrageous conduct, see infra
text accompanying notes 186-207.
159. 501 F. Supp. at 1200.
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for the defendants' assurances of using their official positions to
pave the way for expeditious completion of the project."'""
The court of appeals pointed out facts which dispel any notion
that legitimate consulting work was to be conducted. For example,
Schwartz boasted that he had five or six city council members he
could give to the Sheik's representative for his birthday, and Jan-
notti agreed that there would be no problems and that he would
use his political influence.1'' These questions of fact regarding ex-
pectations and influence are for jury determination. Furthermore,
"it is neither material nor a defense to bribery that 'had there been
no bribe, the [public official] might, on the available data, lawfully
and properly have made the very recommendation that the
[briber] wanted him to make.'
In toto, the district court in Jannotti ruled that acceptance of
the money itself was insufficient to show predisposition and that
the payments were such "attractive inducements" as to overwhelm
defendants.'6 " As previously discussed, however, acceptance of
bribe offers may in itself establish predisposition, especially if
there is ready acquiescence in such offers.1 64 The Third Circuit rea-
soned that predisposition more often than not has to be proven by
circumstantial evidence such as actions, words, demeanor, and so
forth,16 5 or by proof of defendant's prior convictions or participa-
tion in similar transactions.' 6 Predisposition is especially difficult
160. Id. at 1184.
161. 673 F.2d at 600-601.
162. Id. at 601 (quoting United States v. Labovitz, 251 F.2d 393, 394 (3d Cir.
1958)).
163. 501 F. Supp. at 1200. The third factor relied upon by the district court
in overruling the jury was that acceptance of the bribes was necessary to "satisfy
the Arab state of mind" and therefore secure building of the hotel in Philadel-
phia. The court of appeals, however, ruled that the record revealed that the
agents told Schwartz during their meeting that the Sheik had already selected
Philadelphia as his new home and location of the proposed hotel-i.e., construc-
tion of hotel was not contingent on acceptance of payments. 673 F.2d at 602.
(Since the district court overruled the jury's verdict, the court of appeals could
look at the same evidence. Id. at 598.)
164. Id. at 599; United States v. Valencia, 645 F.2d 1158, 1167-68 (2d Cir.
1980); United States v. Viviano, 437 F.2d 295, 299 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
983 (1971). See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
165. 673 F.2d at 603. See United States v. Ordmer, 554 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1977); United States v. Lemons, 470 F.2d 135 (3d Cir.
1972) (per curiam), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 929 (1973).
166. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 488-89 (1976); United
States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 433 (1973). Hearsay evidence, however, is not ad-
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to prove in cases of official corruption, as expressed in Jannotti:
Because such officials are often intelligent, educated and worldly,
it is unlikely that they will accept money from those to whom
they have not had "safe" introductions and who, because they are
also implicated, are unlikely to report to the authorities. In addi-
tion, because the crime has no direct victim, its occurrence leaves
no public trail which cries for investigation. Since the ultimate
factual determination is whether the defendant was "ready and
willing to commit the crime if an opportunity should be
presented," as distinguished from having been corrupted by some
overreaching or special inducement . . the very acceptance of a
bribe by a public official may be evidence of a predisposition to
do so when the opportunity is presented. 6 '
Thus, the Third Circuit reaffirmed the adequacy of production
by the government of mere acceptance of the bribes and other cir-
cumstances in proving predisposition to commit the crime.
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit has ruled that, "While none of
the factors alone indicates either the presence or absence of predis-
positions, the most important factor, as revealed by the Supreme
Court and other decisions, is whether the defendant evidenced re-
luctance to engage in criminal activity which was overcome by re-
peated government inducement."'68 In fact, the Ninth Circuit did
not find a case in which the defense of entrapment was successful
where the defendant did not indicate reluctance to engage in illegal
activity. 6" Indeed, neither Schwartz nor Jannotti refused the
money offered.17 0
missible. United States v. Catanzaro, 407 F.2d 998, 1000-01 (3d Cir. 1969). See
Parks, supra note 67 at 163.
167. 673 F.2d at 604 (citation omitted). "Researchers have found it difficult
to locate a case in which the defense of entrapment has been successfully inter-
posed in prosecutions of public officials for accepting, agreeing to receive, or solic-
iting bribes." Id. at 604 n.13. See Annot., 69 A.L.R.2d 1397, 1431 (1960).
168. United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d at 604 (quoting United States v.
Reynoso-Ulloa, 548 F.2d 1329, 1336 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 926
(1978)).
169. United States v. Reynosa-Ulloa, 548 F.2d 1329, 1336 n.11 (9th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 926 (1978).
170. Additional evidence existed, according to the court of appeals in Jan-
notti, which the jury could have used in deciding the question of predisposition:
Schwartz's acceptance of "finder's fee," shortly after acceptance of the $30,000, in
return for introducing Criden to Jannotti, and the introduction of Jannotti, an-
other public official, so that he could participate in a similar transaction. 673 F.2d
at 605.
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Circumstantial evidence, moreover, is usually the only way in
which intent can be proven. With regard to video tapes of the
transaction, the Third Circuit in Jannotti reasoned that "this jury
had in its hands some of the most valuable tools possible with
which to conduct its inquiry into the state of mind of each defen-
dant, the crucial factor in an entrapment defense. 1 71 Similarly,
the district court in United States v. Myers,172 expressed that
there cannot be a more reliable basis for measuring the culpability
of defendants than video tapes.'7 3 With video tapes, the jury may
observe the defendant's mannerisms and voice inflections, and
whether there is any reluctance by defendant when the money is
handed to him. The jury can see the occurrence itself, preferably
from the beginning of the discussions to the transaction itself.
The Third Circuit in Jannotti further elaborated that,
The ultimate factual decision in an entrapment case must be left
to the jury. Where, as here, the jury was uniquely equipped to
inquire into the calculus of human interaction, a court should not
interfere with its conclusions. We conclude that in determining
that defendants were entitled to a judgment of acquittal on the
ground of entrapment as a matter of law the district court im-
pemissibly substituted its own determination of the credibility of
witnesses, the weight of the evidence and the inferences to be
drawn from the evidence for that of the jury.174
The dissent in Jannotti, however, argued that an additional
fault with allowing the jury to decide the question of predisposi-
tion is that it prejudices defendants.175 The dissent reasoned that
since the Third Circuit requires a defendant to admit commission
of the acts making up the offense,'7 6 a jury is reluctant to let the
defendants go free on a "technicality" as judges will. 77 In the
other circuits, however, admission of the elements of the crime is
not required.'7 8 With the use of videotapes moreover, party admis-
171. 673 F.2d at 604.
172. 527 F. Supp. 1206 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd in part and rev'd and re-
manded in part on other grounds, 692 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1982).
173. Id. at 1223.
174. 673 F.2d at 606.
175. Id. at 614.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Denial of elements does not preclude assertion of the entrapment de-
fense in the fourth, sixth, ninth and District of Columbia circuits, and possibly
the second circuit. See Annot., 54 A.L.R. Fed. 644 (1981).
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sion is not necessary because the jury simply views what happened.
Thus, video tapes provide the jury with a better means than
testimony alone of determining a defendant's intent and disposi-
tion to commit the crime-a different question from the "reasona-
bleness" or "outrageousness" of the government's conduct.
B. Due Process of Law
The second entrapment-type of defense is the due process
claim. For the defense to be sustained, the government's conduct,
objectively considered, must be so extreme as to be
"outrageous."1 79
In application as well as in its language, this defense has sus-
tained little success, with only a few cases where the government's
conduct was declared unconstitutional.180 For instance, Mr. Justice
Powell in Hampton said that "the cases, if any, in which proof of
predisposition is not dispositive will be rare," and that "[p]olice
overinvolvement in crime would have to reach a demonstrable level
of outrageousness before it could bar conviction." 81
The Third Circuit in Jannotti reversed the district court's rul-
ing that the government's conduct in offering the bribes to
Schwartz and Jannotti amounted to a violation of due process of
law. The district court's ruling on this constitutional issue was
based upon the same factors upon which it made its finding of en-
trapment-basically, that the offers were such attractive induce-
ments as to overwhelm the defendants.1 8 2 The court of appeals rea-
soned that "[iut is plain from the Court's opinions in Russell and
the separate opinions in Hampton, however, that a successful due
process defense must be predicated on intolerable government con-
duct which goes beyond that necessary to sustain an entrapment
defense." '83 To allow a lesser showing of government conduct to
179. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 490 (1976); United States
v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973).
180. See supra notes 96-98.
181. 425 U.S. at 495 n.7 (Powell, J., concurring in the result).
182. United States v. Jannotti, 501 F. Supp. at 1204. The district court
stated: "[I]t is neither necessary nor appropriate to the task of ferreting out crime
for the undercover agents to initiate bribe offers, provide extremely generous
financial inducements, and add further incentives virtually amounting to an ap-
peal to civic duty." Id. at 1204.
183. United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d at 607. The Court in Russell, how-
ever, apparently did not directly rule that to be a violation of due process the
government's conduct must be beyond that necessary to sustain an entrapment
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suffice as outrageous conduct, would transform the subjective in-
tent (predisposition) standard of entrapment into the objective
standard relative to the government's conduct. 84 While there is
merit in the logic of this concern of transforming the real test, such
a rule requiring that the degree of government conduct necessary
to sustain a due process claim must go beyond that conduct neces-
sary to sustain an entrapment defense, approaches the rule advo-
cated by Mr. Justice Rehnquist and two other justices in Hampton
that a predisposed defendant is precluded from asserting a due
process claim. While the government's conduct in Jannotti may
not amount to being outrageous, even predisposed defendants
should be free from outrageous government conduct-that is, soci-
ety should be immune from such conduct. But do the same factors
regarding predisposition apply to outrageous government conduct?
The ultimate rationale for the court of appeals' rule was that
the entrapment defense rests with the court's interpretation of leg-
islative intent; that because the defense of entrapment is not of
constitutional dimension, Congress is free to adopt its own entrap-
ment defense; and that constitutional ramifications are wider with
constitutional issues.185
However, the Third Circuit in Jannotti seemed to be saying
that if the government's conduct will trap only the unwary
guilty-i.e., those predisposed-and it does not implant in the
mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit the crime,
then the government's conduct is not outrageous in itself even
though it conceivably might induce a hypothetical otherwise inno-
cent person to commit the crime. The court then is to determine if
the government's conduct, objectively considered, is something on
the order of "shocking to the conscience"-outrageous.
Nevertheless, the Third Circuit in Jannotti expressed its in-
defense.
While three members of the Court in Hampton opined that a due process
claim is precluded if predisposition is found, the remaining justices ruled that a
finding of predisposition does not bar a due process claim-thus, the majority
rule. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
184. 673 F.2d at 607-608.
185. Id. at 607. The court cited United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. at 433. The
court further reasoned that, "We must necessarily exercise scrupulous restraint
before we denounce law enforcement conduct as constitutionally unacceptable;
the ramifications are wider and more permanent than only when a statutory de-
fense is implicated." 673 F.2d at 607.
186. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. at 431-32. Cf. Rochin v. Califor-
nia, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
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tention to adhere to the long standing subjective approach of the
entrapment question and not allow the due process defense to be-
come just another term for an objective test of entrapment.' In-
deed, while the lines are hazy, the majority of the Supreme Court
has reserved for a constitutional due process defense only the most
intolerable government conduct.1 88
Requiring a successful due process defense to be predicated on
intolerable government conduct which goes beyond that necessary
to sustain an entrapment defense, may erroneously approach the
minority Supreme Court standard that would preclude a predis-
posed defendant from successfully asserting a due process defense.
However, the reasons for which the district court found outrageous
government conduct did not rise to a constitutional due process
dimension. Because the district court ruled that the government's
conduct in Jannotti was outrageous for the same reason that en-
trapment existed, the Third Circuit ruled that since the govern-
ment "inducements were not so 'exceedingly generous' as to negate
the evidence of predispositions as a matter of law, it follows that
they could not have been so overreaching as to violate the defen-
dants' due process rights.'
' 8 9
The Third Circuit, therefore, apparently justified its rule on
the ground that the "exceedingly generous" standard is an entrap-
ment-predisposition test and not a constitutional due process test.
While in Jannotti, the Third Circuit noted that a finding of pre-
disposition does not preclude a successful due process defense, it
nonetheless concluded that "where, as here, the extent of govern-
ment inducement necessarily was considered by the fact finder in
its rejection of the entrapment defense, and we have held that is-
sue as appropriately submitted to the jury, a successful due process
defense must be predicated on other grounds."1 90 This idea dan-
gerously approaches the Rehnquist preclusion theory. The jury in
considering the question of entrapment focuses primarily on the
subjective intent of defendant and not as much on the govern-
ment's conduct. The Third Circuit's rule in Jannotti, therefore, in
effect allows the jury to determine that due process of law was not
187. 673 F.2d at 608 ("we must be careful not to undermine the Court's con-
sistent rejection of the objective test of entrapment by permitting it to re-emerge
cloaked as a due process defense.") Id.
188. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. at 427; United States v. Jannotti;
673 F.2d at 608.
189. 673 F.2d at 608.
190. Id.
19831 403
27
Franks: Constitutional Law - Entrapment and Due Process of Law - The Effi
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1983
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
violated by finding defendants predisposed. But in Jannotti, the
due process question was the same as the entrapment ques-
tion-whether the bribe offers were "exceedingly generous." Fur-
thermore, when a jury finds that a defendant was predisposed to
commit the crime, theoretically at least, it is finding that the gov-
ernment's conduct did not implant the criminal intent in the de-
fendant's mind '91 and that the government's conduct did not lay a
trap for the unwary innocent. 92 Thus, the jury probably interjects
their own feelings into deciding whether the government's conduct
was overreaching. Ultimately, however, the constitutional question
should be left to the judge.
At any rate, the question in Jannotti was, according to the
district court judge, whether the inducements offered by the gov-
ernment were so "exceedingly generous" as to be outrageous. But
is whether inducements are "exceedingly generous" a due process-
outrageous conduct question? Accordingly, the standard to govern
what is "exceedingly generous" to a white-collar legislator is not
the same standard to govern what is "exceedingly generous" to a
street corner drug pusher or office clerk. Certainly, constitutional
standards cannot establish amounts as "exceedingly generous" to
fit all types of people ensnared in a government "sting" opera-
tion.1 93 Also, even if amounts could be set to define "exceedingly,"
set rules may allow intelligent criminals to design their activities
around the rules.1 94 What is "exceedingly generous," therefore, is
quite appropriately a question of fact as it relates to Jannotti.
Thus, the language in Jannotti that the amount of govern-
ment conduct necessary to sustain a due process defense must sur-
pass that necessary to sustain an entrapment defense dangerously
approaches the would-be approach of a minority of the Supreme
Court which would preclude a predisposed defendant from success-
fully asserting the due process defense. Society should be protected
from government conduct that is "shocking to the conscience."
When, however, the government conduct in question ultimately
rests with whether the inducements offered were so "exceedingly
generous" as to be "outrageous," as the district court found in
Jannotti, a question of fact about entrapment exists rather than a
191. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
192. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
193. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 494 n.5 (1976) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
194. See Parks, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REv. 163, 228
(1976).
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question of constitutional dimension. The result rendered by the
Third Circuit in Jannotti was therefore correct.
What is "outrageous" government conduct then? The FBI's
conduct in Jannotti falls short of the government's conduct in
United States v. Twigg.195 In Twigg, DEA agents "set up" the de-
fendant, "encouraged him" and "provided the essential supplies
and technical expertise.""' In Jannotti, however, the FBI pro-
vided neither material nor technical expertise in assistance to de-
fendants; the FBI "merely created the fiction that it sought to buy
the commodity-influence-that the defendants proclaimed they
already possessed.' 197
Perhaps then, a distinction can be made. On the one hand the
government provides: (1) the body of the crime itself-the chemi-
cals needed to manufacture illegal drugs or the illegal drugs alone;
(2) the means by which to accomplish an otherwise practically im-
probable act; and (3) the temptations to commit the crime. On the
other hand, the government provides the temptations alone or in
addition provides the body of the crime, without having to provide
the means. The former can be characterized by Twigg as being out-
rageous. But the latter, such as supplying the corpus delecti it-
self " 8 or supplying only a portion of the means by which to accom-
plish the illegal task, 9 9 does not amount to outrageous behavior.
Furthermore, merely supplying the fruits, such as bribe money, to
one who already possesses the means, acts of corrupt influence,
amounts to even less. 2
00
195. 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978) (where "outrageous" conduct found). See
supra note 96 and accompanying text.
196. Id. at 381.
197. United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d at 608.
198. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976) (where government
agents supplied the heroin). See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
199. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973) (where government
supplied essential ingredient to manufacture illegal drug). See supra note 78 and
accompanying text.
200. In a separate ABSCAM trial, the Second Circuit stated that, "The bare
suggestion to a Congressman that he take a bribe, even for a promise he need only
pretend to make, surely does not violate a constitutional standard of 'outrageous'
behavior." United States v. Myers, 692 F.2d 823, 843 (2d Cir. 1982). The Second
Circuit rejected the argument that the government "created" the crimes, for the
government merely produced people with false identities who were ready to pay
bribes to Congressmen and then waited to see who showed up to take the bribes
and videotape them in the act of doing so. Id. at 837.
The district court had ruled that the government's solicitation of bribes to
Congressmen was not outrageous for two reasons: (1) defendants could simply
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C. The Need For ABSCAM Type Of Operations
ABSCAM and similar "sting" operations raise several issues:
whether probable cause should be required before the government
can validly initiate the operation; whether the government should
provide inducements; whether the government is creating crime
just to prosecute; whether government law enforcement should use
deceit; and whether there is a need for detection of "victimless"
crimes.
Should the government have probable cause or reasonable sus-
picion before attempting to ensnare those who are ready and will-
ing to participate in the criminal activity targeted, or should the
government offer the opportunity to anyone who is willing? Both
the Second and Third Circuits have ruled that neither probable
cause nor reasonable suspicion is required before initiation of an
have said "no" to the offers (as three other legislators presented with identical
offers did refuse them), and (2) the government's involvement was less than that
in Hampton, which was not outrageous (for the FBI merely supplied bribe money
and did not also supply favors or "undercover" Congressmen). United States v.
Myers, 527 F. Supp. 1206. (E.D.N.Y. 1981). See also United States v. Myers, 635
F.2d 932 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 956 (1980).
In United States v. Kelly, 539 F. Supp. 363 (D.D.C. 1982), rev'd, 33 CRIM. L.
REP. 2151 (D.C. Cir. May 10, 1983), however, the district court granted a dismissal
on the ground that the government's conduct was in violation of due process.
Where the middleman between the FBI agents and Congressman Kelly told the
agents posing as representatives of the Arab sheik that Kelly had refused the
bribe money but wanted to talk to them about investments in his district and
where Kelly refused the offers in front of the agents, the district court held that
the continued pressing of the bribe in face of the rejections was "overreaching."
Id. There was disagreement in the court of appeals, however, as to whether Kelly
actually refused the bribe. Nevertheless, the court of appeals reversed the district
court and reinstated the jury's conviction.
Even FBI Director Webster had directed that agents were to be sure to turn
away anyone if any ambiguity existed about whether he wanted to take money in
exchange for legislative acts. Id. at 374 n.48. A Justice Department attorney moni-
toring the transaction, however, urged the agent to press on. Id. at 374.
The district court ruled that, "If the government had no knowledge of Kelly
doing anything wrong up to his rejection of illicit money, its continuing role as a
third man in a fight between his conscience and temptation rises above the level
of mere offensiveness to that of being 'outrageous.'" Id. at 376.
The problem with looking at refusals of the bribe offer in regard to the due
process question, however, is how many refusals does it take before the govern-
ment's bribe offers become "outrageous" conduct? If it is limited at one, two, or
whatever number as in Kelly, knowledgeable criminals can merely refuse and
then await another offer to accept. Therefore, is this not a question of fact?
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undercover operation such as ABSCAM.2 0' If the government
targets individuals in advance without probable cause (such as po-
litical targets), however, there may be a violation of due process.02
Then, why not always require probable cause? One argument may
be that on the basis of reasonably suspected past criminal activity
or present suspected activity, individuals would be targeted for de-
ceit by the government. Another argument is that a requirement of
probable cause overlooks the fundamental law enforcement prob-
lem with public corruption, which is extreme difficulty and im-
probability of detection.0 3
Nevertheless, perhaps safeguards aside from probable cause
should be adhered to before-the-fact. There should be guidelines
to prevent coercion of those who do not appear to be willing to
accept the bribe offers. For example, FBI Director Webster issued
instructions that agents were to turn away those potential defen-
dants when there was ambiguity as to whether or not they would
accept money in return for legislation.2 04 Not only does this safe-
guard against entrapment, it also more clearly delineates the ques-
tion of predisposition for the jury.
Another issue is whether the government should be allowed to
induce crime instead of merely trying to detect it after-the-fact.2 0 5
As far back as 1932, in its first address of the entrapment question,
the United States Supreme Court ruled that the fact that the gov-
ernment merely affords the opportunities or facilities for commis-
sion of an offense does not defeat prosecution. 06
Accordingly, artifice and strategem may be employed to catch
201. Myers, 692 F.2d at 835 (Constitution does not require prior suspicion of
criminal activity before Congressman may be confronted with a "governmentally
created opportunity" to commit a crime); Jannotti, 673 F.2d at 609 ("where the
conduct of the investigation itself does not offend due process, the mere fact that
the investigation may have been commenced without probable cause does not bar
the conviction of those who rise to its bait."); United States v. Silver, 457 F.2d
1217, 1220 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Catanzaro, 407 F.2d 998 (3d Cir. 1969).
202. Jannotti, 673 F.2d at 609. In Jannotti, Criden furnished the names and
presence of Schwartz and Jannotti.
203. See infra pp. 409-410.
204. See supra note 200. In Jannotti, the agents, posing as representatives of
the Sheik, instructed Criden not to bring Schwartz or Jannotti unless they were
going to accept the money. 673 F.2d at 609.
205. See infra pp. 110-412.
206. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. at 441. See Hampton v. 'United
States, 425 U.S. at 490-91; United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. at 435; Sherman v.
United States, 356 U.S. at 372.
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those engaged in criminal enterprises as long as the government
does not implant in the mind of an innocent person the disposition
to commit the offense and induce its commission.07 The Third
Circuit in Jannotti further ruled that "it is neither material nor a
defense to bribery that 'had there been no bribe, the [public offi-
cial] might, on the available data, lawfully have made the very rec-
ommendation that [the briber] wanted him to make.' ',08 The Sec-
ond Circuit agrees: "The bare suggestion to a Congressman that he
take a bribe, even for a promise he need only pretend to make,
surely does not violate a constitutional standard of 'outrageous'
behavior."2 0 9
An argument to the contrary contends that providing such
temptations to even the most morally scrupulous runs contrary to
the Judeo-Christian concept of the weakness of man. 10 But the
most morally scrupulous will turn down an illegal offer unless it is
so overwhelming as to implant the disposition in the mind of an
innocent person to commit the criminal offense. Has society be-
come so morally unscrupulous that the ordinary person cannot be
tempted? This is not to say that the government should engage in
the practice of tempting people, just to see if they are morally
scrupulous or if they will commit a crime, for our society should
not live in fear of government oppression or in fear of a secret po-
lice. Yet such "sting" tactics are necessary to combat otherwise vir-
tually undetectable and unknown "victimless" crimes where some-
one passes money to a legislator in return for corrupt influence
from the legislator (without anyone else knowing of the deal).
An interrelated question is whether the government is in effect
creating crime to prosecute. The Supreme Court in Sorrells ex-
pressed this concern: "The first duties of the officers of the law are
to prevent, not to punish crime. It is not their duty to incite to and
create crime for the sole purpose of prosecuting and punishing
207. 287 U.S. at 441-42.
208. 673 F.2d at 601 (quoting United States v. Labovitz, 251 F.2d 393, 394
(3d Cir. 1958)).
209. Myers, 692 F.2d at 843. The Sixth Circuit ruled in 1925 that it is not
automatically entrapment for a government agent to offer a bribe to a public offi-
cial. Scriber v. United States, 4 F.2d 97 (6th Cir. 1925). As to the definiteness of
knowledge that the money offered is a bribe, undercover agents need not say,
"Congressman, I have here a cash bribe to be exchanged for your corrupt promise
to be influenced in your official action." Myers, 692 F.2d at 844.
210. See United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d at 615 (Aldisert, dissenting,
joined by Weis, with the exception of Part VII).
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it."21 While this maxim is inherently valid, a distinction exists be-
tween on the one hand creating crime to manufacture it for prose-
cution and on the other hand creating opportunities to detect and
deter otherwise undetectable crimes.2" 2 In the words of the Second
Circuit in Myers, speaking of its particular portion of ABSCAM:
Though the "sting" was surely elaborate, its essential charac-
teristic was the creation of an opportunity for the commission of
crime by those willing to do so. The Government produced people
with fictitious identities ready to pay bribes to Congressmen.
Word of the availability of bribe money was made known. From
that point on, the essential conduct of the agents and their paid
informant was to see who showed up to take the bribes and video-
tape them doing so." I
The dissent in Jannotti argued, however, that finding fish to
bite does not show predisposition to take the bait,2 " although the
dissent agreed that it is permissible for the government to offer
inducements as long as defendants are predisposed and that the
government may search out contemplated or ongoing criminal con-
duct and participate in the illegal enterprise.2 15
Another argument against ABSCAM type of operations is that
criminal sanctions are not justified when the government "manu-
factures" crimes that would otherwise not occur.216 First, according
to this argument, punishing a defendant who commits a crime
where the government manufactures a crime that would not other-
wise occur is not needed to deter misconduct because, absent the
government's involvement, no crime would have been commit-
ted.21 7 But without the creation of opportunities to detect those
ready and willing to commit on-going or potential crimes, how else
could law enforcement detect "victimless" crimes where both par-
211. 287 U.S. at 444 (quoting Butts v. United States, 273 Fed. 35, 38 (8th Cir.
1921)).
212. Two unacceptable alternatives are either to plant agents in legitimate
operations to monitor transactions, or to completely allow corruption to exist.
213. 692 F.2d at 837.
214. 673 F.2d at 621.
215. Id. at 616. The dissent also expressed fear of a secret police pouring
honey down defendants' throats, id. at 613, and it compares the government's
conduct in Jannotti to Alexander Solzhenitsyn's expression, "Just give us a per-
son-and we'll create the case!" Id. at 617-18.
216. Note, supra 66, at 125. Deterrence, restraint, rehabilitation, or retribu-
tion are expressed as the purposes of criminal sanctions. Id. at 124 n.169.
217. Id. at 125.
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ties to the transaction have an interest in concealment. How else
would society know of a crime such as bribery or extortion? Fur-
thermore, the searching out and consequent publicity of such cor-
ruption is a deterrence to similar conduct, particularly where the
corrupt officials are generally educated and sophisticated.
The next related argument is that a defendant need not be
incarcerated to protect society if that defendant is unlikely to com-
mit the crime without the government's interference.218 The pre-
disposition test, however, takes this concern into consideration.
Had there been a real sheik or developer offering the bribe, the
corruption would never have been detected.2 19 Also, as to the argu-
ment that rehabilitation is not needed if defendant would not have
committed the crime but for the government's involvement, there
is a need for rehabilitation if defendant is predisposed and com-
mits the crime.
The argument that no one is harmed where law enforcement
agents "manufacture" a "victimless" crime fails to grasp the over-
all picture-the harm to society produced by so-called "victimless"
220crimes. Society suffers where public leaders illegally indulge in
and extract tributes from various economic activities, initially re-
lated to public welfare.2
Thus, government law enforcement should not set traps for
the unwary innocent, but those public officials who are clearly
predisposed to commit the crimes-those who are corrupt-should
be detected by the best, if not the only, means existing.
There are contentions, however, that this function is an imper-
missible testing of virtue by the government.2 22 Yet, the Supreme
218. Id.
219. Furthermore, there is a difference between tempting a would-be moon-
shiner as in Sorrells-where detection is easier-and tempting a would-be corrupt
public official.
220. "Victimless" crimes are generally thought of as those illegal exchanges
between willing parties, where there is no direct physical victim.
221. Corruption as in Sicily virtually holds society at its grasp. See H. HEss,
MAFIA AND MAFIOSI: THE STRUCTURE OF POWER (1973). While in Sicilian society
organized corruption has been a way of life for a couple of centuries, and Ameri-
can culture is no comparison, more and more public and private leaders in the
United States, who have legitimate appearing statuses-e.g., business leaders, cor-
porate executives, politicians, judges, and so on-are dipping their hands into ille-
gally tainted activities. The result is that this corrupt influence ultimately embeds
itself in our culture-i.e., it becomes an accepted way of life.
222. For example, the district court in United States v. Kelly, 539 F. Supp.
363, 373 (D.D.C. 1982), rev'd, 33 CRiM. L. REP. 2153 (D.C. Cir. May 10, 1983),
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Court as early as Sorrells indicated that the use of decoys by law
enforcement is permissible to ensnare criminals and present the
opportunity to those intending or willing to commit crime.223 Like-
wise, the Supreme Court in Russell was of the opinion that "there
are circumstances when the use of deceit is the only practicable
law enforcement technique available. It is only when the govern-
ment's deception actually implants the criminal design in the mind
of the defendant that the defense of entrapment comes into
play. 2 24 Even the dissenting opinion in Russell 225 agreed that
"[i]ndeed, many crimes, especially so-called victimles crimes, could
not otherwise be detected. Thus, government agents may engage in
conduct that is likely, when objectively considered, to afford a per-
son ready and willing to commit a crime an opportunity to do
so. '' 226 Furthermore, four of the justices in Sherman expressed
the opinion that although the defendant was entrapped in that
case, "[tlhis does not mean that the police may not act so as to
detect those engaged in criminal conduct and [those] ready and
willing to commit further crimes should the occasion arise. Such
indeed is their obligation. 22 7
The difficulty in detecting bribery, extortion and other forms
of corruption by public officials cannot be overemphasized.
"[N]othing more is required than quick passing of money in return
for a promise of performance by [the] public official of an act that
appears to be an appropriate part of his public duties. '228 Mr.
Chief Justice Warren, writing in Sherman, would seem to agree
where he quoted Judge Learned Hand that "it would seem proba-
ble that, if there were no reply [to the claim of inducement], it
would be impossible ever to secure convictions of any offense
contended that testing virtue is not a function of law enforcement and that is
what the FBI was doing.
223. 287 U.S. at 445.
224. 411 U.S. at 436.
225. Mr. Justice Stewart, joined by Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice
Marshall.
226. 411 U.S. at 445. See also Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
227. 356 U.S. at 384 (Mr. Justice Frankfurter, joined by Mr. Justice Douglas,
Mr. Justice Harlan, and Mr. Justice Brennan, concurring in the result).
As Mr. Justice Powell stated in Hampton, "Police overinvolvement in crime
would have to reach a demonstrable level of outrageousness before it could bar
conviction." 425 U.S. at 495 n.7.
228. Myers, 527 F. Supp. 1206, 1229 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd in part and rev'd
and remanded in part on other grounds, 692 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1982).
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which consist of transactions that are carried on in secret." '229 Ac-
cordingly, bribery may be even more difficult to uncover than drug
deals.230 With contraband such as in illegal drug deals, there is
clear illegality; but with bribery, both aspects of the transaction
are apparently legal-i.e., the money and the actions by the public
officials.23 1
CONCLUSION
As indicated by the recent decisions of the Second and Third
Circuits of the United States Court of Appeals, and by the Su-
preme Court's denial of certiorari, the government will be permit-
ted to conduct ABSCAM type of undercover "sting" operations,
which are designed to uncover ongoing or potential public corrup-
tion, as long as the government does not implant the intent to en-
gage in the criminal conduct in the defendant's mind and as long
as the government's conduct does not rise to an unconstitutional
level of "outrageousness."
The Third Circuit in United States v. Jannotti held that the
acceptance by two Philadelphia City Council members of $30,000
and $10,000 respectively as bribe offers from FBI agents posing as
representatives of a mythical Arab Sheik was in violation of federal
criminal law, that there was no entrapment as a matter of law
where the jury found the defendants to be predisposed, and that
such conduct by the FBI was not in violation of due process. The
Third Circuit in so ruling adhered to the subjective approach of
the entrapment defense as set out by Supreme Court decisions, de-
spite advocacy of an objective approach by a minority in the Su-
preme Court decisions. The decision reaffirms jury determination
of whether a defendant was entrapped-that is, whether defendant
was predisposed or whether the government implanted in defen-
dant's mind the disposition to commit the offense. Furthermore,
the decision, in effect, leaves for jury determination the question of
whether the amount offered as bribe money by the government
was "excessive." Thus, whether the amount was excessive is more
of a question of fact than a question of law.
The net effect of the ABSCAM decisions is to rightfully allow
229. 356 U.S. at 377 n.7 (editing theirs) (quoting United States v. Sherman,
200 F.2d 880, 882 (2d Cir. 1952)).
230. Jannotti, 673 F.2d at 609; Myers, 527 F. Supp. at 1230-31.
231. Myers, 527 F. Supp. 1206, 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd in part and rev'd
and remanded in part on other grounds, 692 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1982).
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the government to conduct these "sting" operations to combat
public corruption, and such conduct is not a violation of due pro-
cess in itself.
The courts recognize the need for such government "sting" op-
erations despite argument that such conduct may be overreaching.
Judge Pratt in United States v. Myers most eloquently provides
a response to this concern:
Some would say, however, that mere difficulty of detection does
not create a need for undercover, infiltrating tactics such as were
used in Abscam. More is needed, specifically a serious harm to
society, and, there are those who would argue that bribery and
corruption in our public officials should be viewed with a tolerant
"boys will be boys" attitude. This argument the court rejects cat-
egorically. Honesty, integrity, truthfulness and sincerity are es-
sential qualities for effective leadership in our society. Tolerance
of corruption has no place here. The cynicism and hypocracy dis-
played by corrupt officials, pretending to serve the public good,
but in fact furthering their own private gain, probably pose a
greater danger to this country than all of the drug traffickers
combined. Corrupt leaders not only betray their constituents, but
also contribute to a moral decay in American society that many
view as the forerunner of economic, political and social disaster.232
Dennis Franks
232. 527 F. Supp. 1206, 1229 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), afJ'd in part and rev'd and
remanded in part on other grounds, 692 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1982).
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